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INSURANCE LAW:
AGE:

OHIO'S UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVER-

A NEW LOOPHOLE-Hill v. Allstate Insurance Company,

50 Ohio St. 3d 243, 553 N.E.2d 658 (1990).
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 25, 1990, the Ohio Supreme Court created a loophole in
underinsured motor vehicle coverage when it decided Hill v. Allstate
Insurance Company.' Generally, underinsured motorist coverage in
Ohio allows a victim to recover from his/her own insurance company
based on the negligence of a tortfeasor whose liability limits are less
than the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits.' In Hill, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that underinsured motorist coverage recovery is not available to an insured when the tortfeasor's liability limits
are identical to the insured's underinsured motorist limits, even when
the insured's recovery has been reduced by multiple claimants. 3
In a sharply divided court, the majority in Hill maintained that
the clear and unambiguous language of the controlling statute dictated
the result," The dissent argued that this result conflicts with stated public policy 5 which is to place the insured victim in the position he/she

would have been if injured by an uninsured motorist.
The dissent contended that there will be many instances where an
insured would be in a superior position if injured by an uninsured motorist rather than by an underinsured motorist. 6 The dissent further ar1. 50 Ohio St. 3d 243, 553 N.E.2d 658 (1990).
2. Comment, Redefining UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage in Ohio, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 771,
785 .(1983).
3. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 553 N.E.2d at 661. This decision disregards the amount
actually compensated, even if reduced by multiple claimants, and only focuses on policy limits.
4. Id. at 245, 553 N.E.2d at 661. The underinsured motorist statute reads:
[U]nderinsured motorist coverage, which shall be in an amount equivalent of coverage to
the automobile liability or motor vehicle liability coverage and shall provide protection for
an insured against loss for bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, where the
limits of coverage available for payment to the insured under all bodily injury liability
bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the limits
for the insured's uninsured motorist coverage at the time of accident. The limits of liability
for an insurer providing underinsured motorist coverage shall be the limits of such coverage, less those amounts actually recovered under all applicable bodily injury liability bonds
and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989) (emphasis added). The main disagreement between the majority and dissent in Hill rests on the words "available for payment" and "at
the time of the accident." See infra text accompanying notes 95-107.
5. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 665. This same language outlining public
policy is also stated by the majority in support of its position. Id. at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661.
6. Id. at 249, 553 N.E.2d at 664 n.8. It is important to note the difference between uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured motorist coverage. Uninsured motorist coverage deals
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gued that the majority's opinion overrules the Wood v. Shepard7 hold-

ing. Under Wood, each wrongful death action derived from an
underinsured motorist fatality will be considered a separate and dis-

tinct injury suffered by the person bringing the claim.8 Therefore, if
there are multiple wrongful death claims, the recovery will be subject
not to the per person limits of a policy but to the per accident limits. 9
The majority countered that the question of wrongful death claims had

not been reached as a threshold matter because the tortfeasor was not
underinsured. 10
This casenote discusses four aspects of the decision in Hill. The
first aspect is the tension between the majority's interpretation of the
underinsured motorist coverage statute and the public policy considerations supporting the statute. 1 The second aspect is the loophole in coverage created by the holding in Hill and whether the legislature anticipated this result. 2 The third aspect is the question of whether Hill
effectively overrules Wood.' Finally, this casenote examines the impact
of the Hill decision." This casenote concludes that the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision in Hill created an unnecessary loophole in underinsured motorist coverage when multiple claimants are involved.

with the case where the tortfeasor has failed to purchase liability insurance or carries such insurance but the limits are less than those statutorily required. 3 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 35.01 (2d ed. 1991 rev.). Underinsured motorist coverage deals with the case
where the tortfeasor has complied with the statutorily required liability limits but the victim either
carries higher underinsured motorist coverage limits than the tortfeasor's liability limits or the
victim's damages exceed the tortfeasor's liability limits. MATTHEW BENDER & Co., No-FAULT
AND UNINSURED MOTORIST AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE § 30.40[l] (1985 & Supp. 1990).
7. 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (1988). The court held "that each wrongful death
beneficiary has a separate claim, compensable up to the subject insurance policy's per occurrence
underinsured motorist coverage limits, even though the policy limited recovery for all damages for
injury or death of one person to a single limit of liability." Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 248, 553
N.E.2d at 663 (citing the syllabus); Wood, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 86, 526 N.E.2d at 1089.
8. Wood, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 88, 526 N.E.2d at 1091. The wrongful death statute provides in
relevant part: "the surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent, all of whom are
rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2125.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1990). The holding in Wood therefore states that all of
the insureds' wrongful death claims are not subject to the per person limit of the policy. Wood, 38
Ohio St. 3d at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1094.
9. Id.
10. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 247, 553 N.E.2d at 662.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 86-147.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 149-156.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 158-182.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 183-192.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/7
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II.

FACTS

& HOLDING

On January 19, 1985, Haywood Shaw, a passenger in a car, died
in an automobile accident. 15 Donald Roberts, another passenger, and
Ervin Heugatter, the owner and operator of the vehicle,'" were also
killed in the same accident." Heugatter caused the accident by negligently colliding with a train. 8
Heugatter was insured by the Western Reserve Mutual Casualty
Company under a policy with liability limits of $50,000 per person injured and $100,000 per accident.' 9 Heugatter's insurance company
paid Shaw's estate $50,000.20 The remaining $50,000 went to Robert's
estate, exhausting Heugatter's policy. 2
Surviving Shaw was his father, son, and daughter, Linda Hill. 22 At
the time of his death, Shaw was insured by Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate). Shaw's policy provided him with underinsured motorist coverage limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per
23
accident.
Linda Hill filed an underinsured motorist claim with Allstate for
$50,000 based on a wrongful death action.24 Allstate denied payment
because Heugatter's liability limits were equal to Shaw's underinsured
motorist limits.2 5 Hill sought a declaratory judgment in the court of
common pleas. 6 Allstate moved for and was granted a judgment on the
pleadings. 7 Hill appealed and the trial court's ruling was affirmed.28
Both lower courts reasoned that Heugatter was not underinsured, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 3937.18,219 because Heugatter's liability limits were equal to and not less than Shaw's underinsured motorist coverage limits.3 " According to the lower courts' interpretations
of the statute, 3" the tortfeasor's liability limits must be less than the
victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits in order for the victim to

15. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 243, 553 N.E.2d at 659.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. Both carried split limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.
26. Id. at 243-44, 553 N.E.2d at 659.
27. Id. at 244, 553 N.E.2d at 659.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Osno REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
30. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 553 N.E.2d at 659-60.
31. The court was referring
Published by eCommons, 1990 to OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
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recover from his/her underinsured motorist coverage. 2 This interpretation is regardless of the actual amount recovered by the victim from the
tortfeasor's insurer. 3 The record was then certified for review and affirmed on the same basis by the Ohio Supreme Court.3"
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

35
Uninsured/UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage Generally

Underinsured motorist coverage developed in response to an insurance gap that existed when states required only uninsured motorist coverage.3 Uninsured motorist coverage was designed to provide a means
of recovery to victims

37

injured by a tortfeasor who had either failed to

purchase liability insurance or carried liability insurance with limits
less than those statutorily required.3 8 Uninsured motorist coverage also
was designed to place the insured victim in the same position he/she
would have been in had the negligent party carried liability insurance
limits at least equal to the minimum limits required by law. 9 The gap
in coverage occurred when a victim was injured by a negligent
tortfeasor who carried the minimum liability limits. The victim's recovery would be limited to the tortfeasor's liability limits. Thus, the victim
might only recover $12,500 if injured by an insured motorist. If, on the
other hand, the same victim is injured by an uninsured motorist, he/she
might recover much more, depending on his/her uninsured motorist
coverage limits.
For example, if the tortfeasor carried $12,500 per person and
$25,000 per accident in liability coverage and the victim carried

32. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 244, 553 N.E.2d at 659-60.
33. Id.
34. id. at 244, 553 N.E.2d at 660.
35. For an excellent discussion of underinsured motorist coverage, see generally, Huelsmann
& Knoebel, Underinsured Motorists: An Evolving Insurance Concern, 17 N. KENT. L. REV. 417
(1990). For a similar discussion regarding Ohio specifically, see generally, Comment, supra note
2, at 771.
36. Huelsmann & Knoebel, supra note 35, at 418.
37. Uninsured rmotorist coverage (as well as underinsured motorist coverage) is not a form
of liability coverage. Instead, it provides first party coverage much like an accident or indemnity
policy. That is, the insured victim makes a claim against his/her own insurance company instead
of the tortfeasor's insurance company. 12a M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 45:624 (2d ed.
1981). Whether the insurance contract provides the coverage that was bargained for in the exchange is the direct issue. Public policy requires that underinsured motorist coverage should place
the insured in the same position he/she would have been in had the insured been injured by an
uninsured motorist. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661.
38. SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 35.01. The present minimum requirements for automobile
liability insurance in Ohio are $12,500 per person and $25,000 per accident. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4509.20(A) (Anderson 1990).
39. SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 35.01; see 2 A. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST INSURANCE § 31.1 (2d ed. 1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/7
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$100,000 per person and $250,000 per accident in uninsured motorist
coverage, the victim would be able to recover only the $12,500 because
the tortfeasor's coverage met the statutorily required minimums. The
victim would have no uninsured motorist claim. Had the tortfeasor
been uninsured, however, the victim would be able to recover up to
$100,000 under the per person limits of his/her own uninsured motorist
coverage, assuming his/her damages were that extensive." ° This result
would occur because the tortfeasor failed to carry the statutorily required liability insurance. Therefore, prior to the introduction of underinsured motorist coverage, the victim was, in many instances, better off
being injured by a uninsured tortfeasor.
Thus, uninsured motorist coverage proved inadequate in two respects. First, when minimum coverage laws failed to keep pace with
actual damages, the minimum limits were often insufficient to compensate the injured victim.41 Uninsured motorist coverage was not triggered when the tortfeasor carried the minimum statutorily required liability insurance, even though these minimums failed to adequately
compensate the victim due to rising medical and economic costs.' 2 Second, inadequate coverage also occurred when there were multiple
claimants. In this situation, the tortfeasor purchased coverage that met
or exceeded the statutorily required minimum, but the actual damage
award was below the required minimum because the available coverage
was split among a number of victims.' 3
In response to these inadequacies, state legislators passed underinsured motorist coverage laws."" Generally, there are two forms of underinsured motorist coverage.' 5 One form focuses on liability limits
while the other form focuses on the victim's damages."' In the first
form, a tortfeasor is deemed underinsured when his/her liability limits
are less than the victim's uninsured motorist coverage limits.' 7 The second form defines the tortfeasor as underinsured when his/her policy
limits are inadequate to compensate the victim fully."
40. If the victim had been killed, those considered insured under his/her policy would be
able to bring separate wrongful death claims. Wood, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1094. In
this case, the recovery would not be limited to $100,000 but to $250,000, the per accident limit of
the decedent's uninsured motorist coverage, assuming there was more than one wrongful death
claim.
41. WIDISS, supra note 39, § 31.2.
42. MATTHEw BENDER & Co., supra note 6, § 30.40[2][c].
43. Id. § 30.40[4].
44. Comment, supra note 2, at 773.
45. Comment, Unraveling the Underinsured Motorist Web: Ohio's Underinsured Motorist
Coverage, 20 AKRON L. REV. 749, 752-56 (1987).
46. SCHERMER, supra note 6, § 35.02.
47. Id.
Published48.
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These two forms of underinsured motorist coverage reflect different theories regarding the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage.

Focusing on liability limits reflects the goal of placing the victim "in
the same position he would have occupied had the tortfeasor's liability
limits been the same as the insured's uninsured motorist limits."' 49 Fo-

cusing on damages, on the other hand, is "to afford the [victim] a
means of recovering all damages suffered as a result of his injuries." 50
B.

Ohio's Underinsured Motorist Coverage

Ohio's first attempt at underinsuried motorist coverage 51 was a
mixture of these two forms. The statute's wording was unclear as to
whether liability limits or actual damages were to be the limiting factor. 52 The language of the statute contained the phrase "insufficient to

pay the loss" suggesting that the victim's damages would be the factor
determining whether the tortfeasor was underinsured. 53 The statute
also contained the phrase "up to the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits" '54 suggesting a comparison between the tortfeasor's liabil-

ity limits and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits to determine if the tortfeasor was underinsured. 5 5 Because of the
uncertainty of which of the two forms of underinsured motorist coverage the legislators intended, the statute was repealed two years later. 5"
The uninsured motorist statute was then amended to include underinsured motorist coverage. 5 7 In the amended version, the phrase "insufficient to pay the loss" was removed along with other changes in the
wording. The removal of this phrase indicates that the comparison is
between the tortfeasor's effective liability limits" and the victim's un-

MATTHEW BENDER & Co., supra note 6, § 30.40[2].
50. Id.
51. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Anderson 1989) (effective in 1980; repealed 1982).
The statute provided in relevant part: "Underinsured motorist coverage means coverage ... protecting an insured against loss . . . where the limits of coverage available for payment to the
insured ... are insufficient to pay the loss up to the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits."
Id.
52. Comment, supra note 2, at 777.
49.

53.

Id.

54. Underinsured motorist coverage is sold in conjunction with uninsured motorist coverage.
Therefore, the limits are identical. When a statute refers to uninsured motorist coverage limits
and this note refers to underinsured motorist coverage limits, the terms are interchangeable. This
applies only in referenci to limits and not to any other aspect of the two different types of coverage. See supra note 6.
55. Id.
56. Comment, supra note 2, at 776; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Anderson
1989)(repealed 1982).
57. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
58. The phrase "effective liability limits" is used because this note argues that, in situations
involving multiple claimants, the comparison is between the amount actually paid to the victim
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/7
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derinsured motorist coverage limits to determine if the tortfeasor is
underinsured.5
C. Ohio Case Law
Prior to the passage of Ohio's first underinsured motorist statute,
the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in Shelby Mutual Insurance Company
v. Smith 0 that a tortfeasor carrying the statutorily required minimum
liability limits was not uninsured when the victim's recovery had been
reduced below the statutorily required liability coverage by multiple
claimants.6" Although Shelby preceded underinsured motorist coverage
in Ohio, the decision is suggestive of the Ohio Supreme Court's approach to cases involving automobile liability insurance and multiple
claimants. That is, if the tortfeasor has met the statutory requirements,
he/she will not be considered uninsured regardless of what was actually
paid to the claimants under the tortfeasor's policy. Similarly, if the
tortfeasor has liability limits equal to the victim's uninsured motorist
coverage, the tortfeasor will not be considered underinsured regardless
of the amount actually paid. At the time of Shelby, "courts were reluctant to define a vehicle as uninsured where its liability limits were reduced by multiple claims." 62 However, since the adoption of underinsured motorist coverage, the trend has been to allow recovery in
multiple claimant cases. 63
Subsequent to the amendment of Ohio's uninsured motorist statute,"' a number of appellate courts faced the question of whether to
classify a tortfeasor as underinsured when multiple claimants had reduced the amount actually recovered below the victim's underinsured
motorist coverage limits. In Brown v. Erie Insurance Company,6 5 the
Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held that a tortfeasor is
underinsured where the victim's recovery has been reduced below the
victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits by multiple claimants. 6
The court reasoned that "the original motivation behind the enactment
of R.C. 3937.181(C) was to assure that persons injured by an underin-

and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits. See infra text accompanying notes 112120. In the situation where only one victim is injured, the comparison is between the tortfeasor's
liability limits and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits because the limits will equal
the amount actually paid.
59. Comment, supra note 2, at 785; see supra note 3 (provides the text of the present underinsured motorist statute in full).
60. 45 Ohio St. 2d 66, 341 N.E.2d 597 (1976).
61. Id. at 69, 341 N.E.2d at 599.
62. MATrHEW BENDER & Co., supra note 6, § 30.40[4].
63. Id.
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
65. 35 Ohio App. 3d 11, 519 N.E.2d 408 (1986).
66. byId.
at 12, 519 N.E.2d
Published
eCommons,
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sured motorist would receive at least the same amount of total compensation that they would have received if they had been injured by an
uninsured motorist. ' 67 The court found that this was a general policy
statement regarding underinsured motorist coverage that also represented the legislative intent of the amended version.6 8 Therefore, the
court held that the amount actually paid must be equivalent to the
amount the victim could have received had he/she been injured by an
uninsured tortfeasor. Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Lucas
County, in Knudson v. Grange Mutual Companies,9 used identical
reasoning to that used by the court in Brown. The Knudson court also
held that underinsured motorist coverage was applicable when multiple
claimants reduced recovery below the victim's underinsured motorist
70
coverage limits.
In Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Yoby, 7 1 the Ohio Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, however, the court held that underinsured motorist coverage applies only where a tortfeasor's liability limits
are less than the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits. 72 The
distinguishing factor in Yoby was that, although Dawn Yoby's recovery
had been reduced by multiple claimants, she still recovered in excess of
her underinsured motorist limits. 73 She recovered $27,500 from the
tortfeasor's insurer but only carried $25,000 in underinsured motorist
coverage.7 ' The difference between Yoby and the Brown and Knudson
cases is that the court's broad holding in Yoby would still disallow recovery from the victim's underinsured motorist coverage as long as the
limits in the policies were equal. 5 Had the plaintiff in Yoby recovered
less than her underinsured motorist coverage limits, her underinsured
motorist claim would have been disallowed.
Therefore, it became apparent that there was a split among the
appellate courts. The Ohio Supreme Court resolved the conflict with its
decision in Hill, but at the same time created a loophole in underin-

67. Id. (quoting James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Ohio St. 3d 386, 389, 481 N.E.2d
272, 274-275 (1985)).
68. Id. The court was correct in holding that this public policy also applies to the present
statute. It has also been cited by the Ohio Supreme Court as a correct statement of present public
policy. Hill,'50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661.
69. 31 Ohio App. 3d 20, 507 N.E.2d 1155 (1986).
70. Id. at 23, 507 N.E.2d at 1157.
71. 23 Ohio App. 3d 51, 491 N.E.2d 360 (1985).
72. Id. at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 364.
73. Id. at 52, 491 N.E.2d at 361.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 55, 491 N.E.2d at 364.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/7
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sured motorist coverage. This loophole is found in only one other
76
jurisdiction.
D.

Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Other Jurisdictions

Twenty-four states have statutes that are facially similar to Ohio's
statute. 7 These statutes compare the tortfeasor's liability limit with the
insured's underinsured motorist coverage. Since none of these statutes
have language identical to Ohio's, a proper comparison is difficult.
Most courts in jurisdictions with statutes similar to Ohio's have
been willing to view multiple claimants as reducing the tortfeasor's liability limits and triggering the insured's underinsured motorist coverage. 7 1 In Texas7 9 and West Virginia,8 0 the statutes contain express provisions regarding multiple claimant situations. In other states, the
courts have held that in multiple claimant situations the comparison
should be between the effective coverage8" of the tortfeasor's liability
82
limits and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits.
One other jurisdiction has held that a reduction in recovery due to
multiple claimants will not allow the victim to make an underinsured
motorist claim.8 3 In New York, it has been held that the victim is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits only where the tortfeasor's liability limits were less than those limits contained in the victim's underin-

76. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83; N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(0(2) (McKinney
1985).
77. Huelsmann & Knoebel, supra note 35, at 427 n.41 (provides a list of the underinsured
motorist statutes placing the victim in a position of recovery equivalent to his/her uninsured motorist coverage).
78. Id. at 429.
79. TEX. INs. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1(2)(b) (Vernon 1981). An underinsured motor vehicle
includes one where liability limits "have been reduced by payment of claims arising from the same
accident to, an amount less than the . . . underinsured coverage." Id.
80. W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (Supp. 1991). An underinsured motor vehicle is defined as
one where liability limits "[have) been reduced by payments to others insured in the accident to
limits less than limits the insured carried for underinsured motorist's coverage." Id.
81. See supra note 58.
82. See, e.g., St. Arnaud v. Allstate Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (applied
Mississippi law); Jones v. Travelers Indem. Co. of R.I., 368 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1979); Butler v.
MFA Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1129 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Ballanger v. Toenjes, 362 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985).
83. The New York legislators made a very clear choice to disallow underinsured motorist
coverage in multiple claimant situations. The New York statute reads in relevant part:
Supplementary uninsured motorists insurance shall provide coverage, in any state or Canadian province, if the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance
policies of another motor vehicle liable for damages are in a lesser amount than the bodily
injury liability insurance limits of coverage provided by such policy.
N.Y. INs. LAW § 3420(0(2) (McKinney 1985); compare with Ohio's underinsured motorist statute which contains the phrase "available for payment to the insured" when comparing the limits
of the tortfeasor
and victim.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989); see also
Published
by eCommons,
1990
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sured motorist coverage." This was despite the fact that multiple
claimants had reduced the actual recovery below the victim's underinsured motorist limits. Thus, Ohio is one of two states that does not
allow recovery up to the underinsured motorist coverage limits when
multiple claimants have reduced the victim's recovery below his/her
underinsured motorist coverage limits.
For example, in Ohio and New York, if a victim has underinsured
motorist coverage limits of,$50,000 and a tortfeasor has identical liability limits of $50,000, the victim will be unable to pursue an underinsured motorist claim. This policy is reasonable if the victim is the only
one injured because he/she will recover up to the amount of his/her
underinsured motorist coverage ($50,000).
The following examples illustrate the effect that arbitrary circumstances, such as the number of people injured in the accident and the
liability limits of the tortfeasor, can have on the victim's ability to recover. If the victim is one of five people injured and each receives
$10,000 from the tortfeasor's limits of $50,000, the tortfeasor's coverage will be exhausted. The victim, carrying $50,000 in underinsured
motorist limits, will be unable to make an underinsured motorist claim
even though he/she carried $40,000 more in underinsured motorist coverage than was actually recovered ($10,000). Further, if the victim carried underinsured limits of $100,000, he/she would have a viable underinsured motorist claim because his/her underinsured motorist
coverage limits exceeded the tortfeasor's liability limits ($100,000 compared to $50,000). In this situation, the victim would be able to recover
an additional $90,000 from his/her own insurer,8 5 over and above the
$10,000 already received.8 6 Thus, arbitrary circumstances, such as the
number of people injured in the accident and the liability limits of the
tortfeasor, significantly affect the victim's recovery.

84. Manfredo v. Centennial Ins. Co., 124 A.D.2d 979, 508 N.Y.S.2d 811 (App. Div. 1986).
85. It is important to note that once underinsured motorist coverage is triggered, the recovery is for the difference between the amount actually recovered and the limits of the underinsured
motorist coverage. The recovery is not limited to the difference between the tortfeasor's liability
limits and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits. This is regardless of whether there
were multiple claimants or only a single victim. In the example given, this leads to the anomalous
result that the victim who carries $100,000 in underinsuredmotorist coverage recovering not only
the $50,000 in additional coverage he/she carries over the tortfeasor's liability limits, but also the
$40,000 that the other victims were not allowed to recover because they carried underinsured
motorist coverage equal to the tortfeasor's liability limits. The two solutions to this anomaly are to
disallow recovery of the $40,000 for all of the victims or allow all of them to recover the $40,000.
The equitable solution is to allow all of the victims to recover the $40,000 and avoid basing recovery on arbitrary circumstances.
86. This example assumes that the damages of the victim exceed $100,000. For another
example of this inequity see Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 249, 553 N.E.2d at 664 n.8.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss3/7
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IV.

ANALYSIS

The main problem with the Hill decision is that the majority's
application of underinsured motorist coverage fails to close the gap in
coverage that the statute was intended to fill. 87 Additional problems

with the Hill decision include its failure to effectuate public policy,88
dependence on arbitrary circumstances,8 9 and improper interpretation
of Ohio's underinsured motorist coverage statute. 90
Had Shaw died due to the negligence of an uninsured motorist, his
family would have recovered $100,000 rather than the $50,000 they
actually received. 91 The $100,000 recovery is based on the Wood holding which ruled that derivative claims of a wrongful death action are
not subject to the per person limit but rather to the per accident limit.9"
Traditionally, if only one person is injured in an accident, the recovery
is limited to the per person limit of a policy. Nevertheless, Ohio's
wrongful death statutes presume separate' injury to those who survive
the victim and are considered insured under his/her policy.9 3 All other

injuries in Ohio, if suffered by one person, are subject to the per person
limits of an insurance policy.
An illustration would be the case where the victim is severely injured rather than killed. If the victim is injured and has underinsured
motorist coverage with split limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000
per accident, then the recovery will be limited to $50,000. If the victim
is killed, however, then each person who is considered insured under
the policy would have a separate and distinct wrongful death claim,
even though only one person suffers bodily injury. The recovery in this
case would be limited by the per accident limit which is $100,000, assuming there is more than one wrongful death claim.94 Therefore, in Hill, Shaw's underinsured motorist coverage did not indemnify him or
his family members, who are considered insured under the policy, to
the extent they would have been indemnified had he been injured by an
uninsured motorist.9 5

87. See supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 111.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 95-147.
91. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
92. Wood, 38 Ohio St. 3d at 91, 526 N.E.2d at 1094.
93. Id.
94. If only one person is bringing a wrongful death claim, then there is only one person
presumed injured. Therefore, this single wrongful death claim will be subject to the per person
limit of the policy.
95. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick, J., dissenting). It is clear that
Shaw's beneficiaries would have received $100,000 had he been killed by an uninsured motorist
because their only recovery would have been from Allstate based on the wrongful death claims
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Public Policy v. Strict Interpretation

The main source of disagreement between the majority and dissent
in Hill rests on the language of the underinsured motorist statute in
light of the stated public policy. Both agree that public policy dictates
that the victim must be placed in the same position in which he/she
would have been had he/she been injured by an uninsured motorist.9 6
The majority and dissent disagree, however, on the application of this
policy to the statute.
The relevant portion of the underinsured motorist statute reads:
"Underinsured motorist coverage . . . shall provide protection
for an
insured . . . where the limits of coverage available for payment to the
insured ... are less than the limits for the insured's uninsured motorist
coverage at the time of the accident."9 7 The majority argued that the
words "available for payment"9 8 in conjunction with "at the time of the
accident" 9 9 left them no room to expand the scope of available coverage.100 The majority stated: "Simply put, the underinsured motorist
statute requires an insurer to provide coverage to its insured when the
tortfeasor's coverage is less than the limits of the insured's uninsured
motorist coverage at the time of the accident."'0 All that is required,
according to the majority, is a simple policy comparison. When the coverage of the policies are equal, the tortfeasor is not underinsured. Since
the majority found this language clear and unambiguous, they refused
to expand the coverage.' 02 To read the statute otherwise, the majority
argued, would ignore the phrase "at the time of the accident."'' 0
The dissent argued that the public policy of placing a victim in the
same position he/she would have been in had he/she been injured by
an uninsured motorist can only be achieved by examining the words
"available for payment"' 0 4 and awarding -recovery based on
those
words.' 05 Thus, what is "available for payment"' 0 6 should be compared
to the victim's underinsured motorist limits to determine if the

that are subject to the per accident limit of the policy ($100,000).
96. Both the majority and dissent agree this is the correct statement of public policy. Id. at
246, 553 N.E.2d at 661; Id. at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 665 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 553 N.E.2d at 661..
101. Id. at 244, 553 N.E.2d at 660.
102. Id. at 247, 553 N.E.2d at 662; 8c J. APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
5067.65 (1981) (argues that courts should not expand coverage when policy limitations are clear).
103. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 245, 553 N.E.2d at 661 n.3.
104. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
105. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 249, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
106. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
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tortfeasor is underinsured. This analysis would place the victim of an
underinsured tortfeasor in the same position of recovery had he/she
been injured by an uninsured motorist.
Although the dissent's result comports with public policy, it never
addressed the words "at the time of the accident." 10 7 Either these
words are surplusage, which is contradictory to the canon of statutory
interpretation that all words and phrases are included for a purpose,"'
or public policy overrides their import. As the dissent never addresses
this problem, it is not clear which alternative is being applied.
There were alternative arguments available to the dissent. For example, it could have argued that the words, "at the time of accident," 0 9 are repugnant to the purpose of the statute and therefore
should be ignored." 0 If the phrase, "at the time of the accident,""' is
interpreted as controlling, it will continually limit recovery in cases
where there are multiple claimants and public policy will not be
achieved." 2
Also, the dissent could have argued that these words were intended
only to modify the immediately preceding phrase. That is, "at the time
of the accident""' is simply a reference point to establish the "insured's uninsured motorist coverage""' limits. The actual comparison
of coverage is made later, once it can be established what portion of the
tortfeasor's liability coverage is "available for payment.""' This argument makes the most sense. Applying the phrase "at the time of the
accident""' to the phrase "available for payment '""17 is internally inconsistent because it cannot be known "at the time of the accident""' 8
what will be ultimately "available for payment.""' 9 Until the damages
are ascertained at a later date and the claims of the other claimants

107. Id.
108. CRAIES ON STATUTE LAW 104-5 (7th ed. 1971).
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
110. The problem is determining what the clear legislative purpose was. See infra notes
149-156 and accompanying text.
111. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
112. Public policy will not be achieved because, if the victim is injured by an uninsured
motorist, the victim will not have to split his/her award recovered from his/her own insurer. If.the
victim is injured by a tortfeasor who carries liability insurance equal to the victim's underinsured
motorist coverage, the victim will have to split the recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer with the
other victims. In this case, the victim will have no claim against his/her own insurer, and thus,
recover less than what he/she would have if he/she had been the only person injured.
113. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119.byId.
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have been settled, all that can be done is to guess what will be "available for payment"' 2" to the victim. The phrase, "at the time of the accident,"' 21 can only refer to the victim's underinsured motorist coverage
limits. This interpretation of the statute is in line with the public policy
consideration of placing a victim in the same position in which he/she
. would have been had he/she been injured by an uninsured motorist. It
accomplishes this by forcing a comparison between the amount actually
paid by the tortfeasor's insurer to the victim and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits.
This interpretation is not without its difficulties. The problems
with this interpretation are: (1) the punctuation does not suggest such a
limitation; and (2) the phrase immediately preceding "available for
payment" 12 2 speaks in terms of "limits of coverage" 121 suggesting the
comparison is between the limits rather than the amount actually paid.
First, regardless of punctuation, the phrase, "at the time of the accident," 124 makes no sense modifying the phrase "available for payment ' 12 5 because the two clauses are inconsistent and logically incompatible.1 26 Second, the phrase, "limits of coverage available for
'
is immediately followed by the phrase "to the insured. 1 28
payment,' 11
In the case of the multiple claimants, the tortfeasor's liability limits are
not "available for payment to the insured. 1' 29 What is "available for
payment to the insured" 1 30 will be uncertain until the claims of the
other injured parties have been resolved.
A possible counter to these arguments could be accomplished by
referring to the original underinsured motorist statute. The repealed
statute read in relevant part: "Underinsured motorist coverage means
coverage ... protecting an insured against loss ... where the limits of
coverage available for payment to the insured .. . . are insufficient to
pay the loss up to the insured's uninsured motorist coverage limits."1' 31
It could be argued that the legislature chose to retain the phrase, "limits of coverage available for payment to the insured," 13 2 while eliminat-

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 112-119.
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
Id.,
Id.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Anderson 1989) (repealed 1982).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
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ing "insufficient to pay the loss." 133 In effect, the phrase "insufficient to
pay the loss"'I' meant that when the recovery from the tortfeasor was
reduced for some reason, the victim should still be allowed to make an
underinsured motorist claim. Thus, without these qualifying words, the
remaining phrase, "limits of coverage available for payment to the insured," 1 35 requires only a policy comparison regardless of what was actually paid to the victim.
There are three problems with this argument. First, the original
statute was never read in such a manner. The two phrases were read to
imply different types of underinsured motorist coverage.1 36
"[I]nsufficient to pay the loss' 3 7 referred to the victim's actual damages and suggested that, if recovery of the tortfeasor's liability limits
would not make full restitution to the victim, then the victim would
have a valid underinsured motorist claim.'3 8 Rather than modifying one
another, the phrases contradicted each other because they suggested
different theories of underinsured motorist coverage.139 It was because
of this confusion that the statute was repealed two years after its
40
enactment.1
Second, even assuming that the phrases work in conjunction, the
majority must reconcile its interpretation with public policy.' 4 ' In multiple claimant situations, the victim of an underinsured motorist would
42
be better off if he/she had been injured by an uninsured motorist.'
This is contrary to public policy requiring the victim to be in the same
position whether injured by an uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor.
Finally, reading "the limits of coverage available for payment to
the insured"" as the majority does, is internally inconsistent. There is
simply no way to determine what is "available for payment to the insured" 1 4 because the "limits of coverage""' 5 are not fully "available
for payment to the insured""" in a multiple claimant situation."

133. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Anderson 1989) (repealed 1982).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
137. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.181 (Anderson 1989) (repealed 1982).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The majority must do so because it states that its interpretation is in line with public
policy. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661; see supra note 111.
142. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 249, 553 N.E.2d at 664 n.8.
143. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(2) (Anderson 1989).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
notes 112-119.
147.bySee
supra text accompanying
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Therefore, it seems the majority has incorrectly interpreted the
plain meaning of the words of the statute. As a result, the majority
believed that it would be acting beyond its judicial role were the court
to expand the coverage available under the statute. 1 8 The outcome is
unfortunate because a close and careful reading could have avoided future loss to innocent victims.
B.

Did the Ohio General Assembly Anticipate this Loophole?

One effect of amending uninsured motorist statutes to include underinsured motorist coverage is that courts will generally regard the
same public interests as supporting both. 149 The amended version of the
uninsured motorist statute "seems to indicate a legislative intent to
guarantee compensation only up to the limits of the injured insured's
own uninsured motorist coverage limits. ' 15° Thus, assuring recovery to
the extent of uninsured motorist coverage while disallowing greater recovery was a motivating factor behind amending underinsured motorist
coverage in Ohio.'
If the intent was to limit coverage, then the question arises as to
what extent the coverage was to be limited. The Ohio Supreme Court
stated in James v. Michigan Mutual Insurance Company'52 that "the
original motivation behind the enactment of R.C. 3937.181(C) was to
assure that persons injured by an underinsured motorist would receive
at least the same amount of total compensation that they would have
received if they had been injured by an uninsured motorist."15 This
same policy statement is cited by both the majority and dissent in
Hill. 5 Therefore, while James could be distinguished because it was
interpreting the intent of the repealed statute, the same intent has been
attributed to the amended version.' 5 5 This is logical considering underinsured motorist coverage is now part of the uninsured motorist
56
statute.
The question then becomes: Did the legislature anticipate this
loophole in coverage? The reasonable answer is that it did not or it
148. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246-47, 553 N.E.2d at 662 (court will not fashion an excess
provision by judicial fiat).
149. WIDISS, supra note 39, § 32.2; see also Ware v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 33 Ohio App. 3d
74, 75, 514 N.E.2d 440, 441 (1986).
150. Hentemann, Underinsured Motorist Coverage:A New Coverage With New Problems,
56 OHIO ST. B. A. REP. 122, 129 (1983).
151. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 788-791.

152. 18 Ohio St. 3d 386, 481 N.E.2d 272 (1985).
153. Id. at 389, 481 N.E.2d at 275.
154. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661; Id. at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 665 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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would have included a clause that expressly excluded multiple claimants situations from underinsured motorist coverage.15 7 Otherwise, the
public policy would be to place a victim in the position he/she would
have occupied had he/she been injured by an uninsured motorist except when there are multiple claimants. Since the public policy supporting the original statute did not contain this exception, it should not
be included now by judicial interpretation.
C. Has Wood v. Shepard Been Overruled?
The Hill court addressed the assertion that this case should be
controlled by Wood v. Shepard.158 In Wood, it was held that each
wrongful death beneficiary has a separate claim, compensable up to the
subject insurance policy's per occurrence underinsured motorist coverage limits, even though the policy limited recovery for all damages for
injury or death of one person to a single limit of liability.1 59 According
to this reasoning, Shaw's beneficiaries should have received $100,000
based on the per accident limit of the underinsured motorist coverage,
rather than the $50,000 received from Heugatter's insurer.1 6 0
The Hill court distinguished Wood, arguing that, as a threshold
matter, the liability limits of the tortfeasor's policy were equal to
Shaw's underinsured motorist coverage. Thus the court never reached
the question of underinsured motorist coverage.' The threshold matter of whether underinsured motorist coverage is triggered must be
reached before the argument of multiple wrongful death iclaims arising
under the coverage can be addressed. 2 This analysis is correct as long
as the tortfeasor is not considered underinsured because of the wrongful death claims.1 63 Had the majority correctly interpreted the statute
and found-Heugatter to be underinsured, Shaw's family would have
recovered an additional $50,000 from Allstate.
The problem is that the majority in Hill muddles the issue by continuing its analysis of Wood in an attempt to rectify its decision with
public policy. 6 4 Thus, the majority states that an insurer may limit all

157. See supra note 82.
158. 38 Ohio St. 3d 86, 526 N.E.2d 1089 (1988).
159. Id. at 86, 526 N.E.2d at 1089 (citing the syllabus).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
161.- Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 247, 553 N.E.2d at 662.
162. Id.
163. The wrongful death claims work in conjunction with the underinsured motorist statute.
The wrongful death claims are the reason Heugatter should have been deemed underinsured. If
only Shaw had been injured, the proper-recovery would have been $50,000. Since Ohio presumes
separate injuries for those persons bringing'wrongful death claims, the recovery should have been
$100,000.
164.
See supra note1990
140.
Published
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claims, even those arising out of wrongful death, to the per person limit
of a policy by using the proper language.' 65 The court, relying on Tomlinson v. Skolnik 66 which limited a loss of consortium claim to the per
person limit of a policy,16 7 argues that Allstate may contract around
Wood.'6 8 The argument in Tomlinson suggests that an insurer could
limit recovery to the per person limit of a policy as long as the terms
are clear and easily understandable no matter what type of injury was
involved.' 6 9
Using the reasoning from Tomlinson, the Hill court stated that
"damages arising out of a single bodily injury" will be limited to the
per person limit. 7 ° This analysis directly contradicts the majority's assertion that Wood has been distinguished because Wood held that
wrongful death claims are not subject to the per person limit of a policy. 1 7 ' The two arguments are mutually exclusive. Either Wood has
been limited in its application or it has been distinguished and is not
applicable to Hill. The majority would like to be able to reconcile its
decision with public policy, 72 but as it endeavors to do so, it runs into
contradictory arguments.
Finally, the majority argues that the wrongful death claims should
have been brought against Heugatter's insurer. 17 Had the wrongful
death claims been brought against Heugatter's insurer, this still would
not resolve the question of whether Heugatter was underinsured. Realistically, this argument is just a restatement of the first argument asserting that, as a threshold matter, the question of underinsured motorist coverage was not reached. 74 By suggesting that the claim should
have been brought against Heugatter's insurer, the majority is suggesting that there is not a valid underinsured motorist claim. That is,
underinsured motorist claims are brought against the victim's insurer,
not the tortfeasor's insurer. Bringing the claims against Heugatter's insurer, however, does not address the question of whether an underinsured motorist claim can be brought against Allstate, nor does it solve
165. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 661-62.
166. 44 Ohio St. 3d 11, 540 N.E.2d 716 (1989) (case involved a loss of consortium claim).
But see, Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 52 Ohio St. 3d 162, 556 N.E.2d 1150 (1990). This case
reaffirms Wood and states that "the wrongful death statutes not be abridged in any manner whatsoever." Id. at 163, 556 N.E.2d at 1152.
167. Tomlinson, 44 Ohio St. 3d at 13, 540 N.E.2d at 718-19.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 246, 553 N.E.2d at 662.
171. Id. at 244-45, 553 N.E.2d at 660.
172. Id.; see supra note 140.
173. Hill, 50 Ohio St. 3d at 247, 553 N.E.2d at 662.
174. Id. The argument states that "there was no underinsurance available to these beneficiaries under the unambiguous terms of the Allstate policy and R.C. 3937.18(A)(2)." Id.
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the question of why Wood is inapplicable in this case. Therefore, by
arguing that the claims should have been brought against Heugatter,
the court is implying that there is no claim of underinsured motorist
coverage available.
The dissent argued that Wood was controlling because of its holding that multiple wrongful death claims are subject only to the per accident limits of underinsured motorist coverage. 17 5 Further, the dissent
argued that the proper comparison is between the amount of the
tortfeasor's liability limits available for payment and the victim's underinsured motorist coverage limits. 7 Thus, since there were separate
claims for wrongful death and only $50,000 was available for payment,
Heugatter was underinsured because Shaw carried underinsured motorist coverage with per accident limits of $100,000.1'"
The majority also agreed with the public policy underlying underinsured motorist coverage; that may explain its over-extensive treatment of Wood.'7 8 The majority's analysis suggests that Wood has been
limited in its applicability. Indeed, it most likely was limited for a short
time.
Subsequent to Hill, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Cincinnati
Insurance Company v. Phillips.7 In this case, David Thompson was
killed in an automobile accident caused by Rosa Phillips. 8 0 David
Thompson was survived by his wife and daughter. The court of appealsruled that all claims, even for wrongful death, were subject to the per
person limits of the underinsured motorist coverage.' The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, stating that its "decision in Wood v. Shepard
. . . demands that the wrongful death statutes . . . not be abridged in
any manner whatsoever."' 8' 2 Further, the court distinguished Tomlinson, holding that wrongful death claims are different from loss of consortium claims, and therefore, wrongful death claims are not subject to
the per person limits of underinsured motorist coverage. 8 Thus, even
if Wood were limited by Hill, it has regained its standing as controlling
law in Ohio.

175. Id. at 248-49, 553 N.E.2d at 663-64 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 249, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that, if
the public policy underlying underinsured motorist coverage is to place the insured in the position
he/she would have been had he/she been injured by an uninsured motorist, then the comparison
must be between the amount available for payment and the limits of the underinsured motorist
coverage. Id. at 249-50, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 250, 553 N.E.2d at 664 (Resnick J., dissenting); see supra note 162.
178. Id. at 246-47, 553 N.E.2d at 662.
179. 52 Ohio St. 3d 162, 556 N.E.2d 1150 (1990).
180. Id. at 162, 556 N.E.2d at 1150-51.
181. Id. at 162-63, 556 N.E.2d at 1151.
182.by Id.
at 163, 5561990
N.E.2d at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
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D. Impact of Hill
The issue of whether a tortfeasor will be deemed an underinsured
motorist when recovery has been reduced by multiple claimants has
been addressed since Hill in TransamericaInsurance Company v. Nolan. 84 In this case, a car accident occurred killing five people and injuring four others.1 8 The tortfeasor was insured with policy limits of
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. 186 Linda and Dennis
Wallace were the divorced parents of Anthony Wallace who was killed
in the accident. 8 Linda and Dennis Wallace each received $26,000
from the tortfeasor's insurer as their share of the payment for the
wrongful death of their son. 88 Linda and Dennis each had insurance
policies with separate companies which had underinsured limits of
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.1 89 The Wallaces each
sued their respective insurers for the remaining $74,000.190
The trial court held for the Wallaces.' 9' The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that Hill is "dispositive of the dispute
between these parties."' 9 2 The appellate court found this result distasteful, stating: "While we do not pretend to like this result, we are
nevertheless resigned to it by the current status of the law."'9 3 Instead
of recovering $200,000 for the loss of their child, the Wallace's received only $52,000 because of a loophole.
Even $200,000 seems inadequate to compensate for the loss of a
child, but liability and indemnity insurance is not directly about placing value on human life. The direct issue is whether the insurance contract provides the coverage that was bargained for in the exchange.
According to public policy, underinsured motorist coverage is supposed
to place the insured in the same position he/she would have been had
he/she been injured by an uninsured motorist.
Nolan establishes that when multiple claimants are present, the
underinsured motorist coverage contract does not provide the coverage
that was bargained for because of a loophole created by the decision in

184. No..89-12-077, No. 89-12-079 (12th App. Dist., Ohio., Sept. 4, 1990) (LEXIS, States
Library, Ohio File).
185. Id. at *2.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at *3 (the trial court's decision was rendered prior to the Hill decision).
192. Id. at *4-5.
193. Id. at *8.
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Hill. Even where a victim recovers only a fraction of the amount
"available for payment" from the tortfeasor's insurer, the victim's underinsured motorist coverage will not alleviate the inequity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Hill created a loophole in underinsured motorist
coverage when multiple claimants are involved. The decision reflects a
reading of the underinsured motorist statute which fails to reach a fair
or just result. The decision is directly contradictory to the public policy
supporting the statute: to place victims in a position of recovery
equivalent to their uninsured motorist coverage. Instead, it allows arbitrary circumstances, such as the number of people injured in the accident and the liability limits of the tortfeasor, to significantly reduce the
recovery of an innocent victim.
Hill tampered with a previous interpretation of Ohio's wrongful
death statutes in attempting to rectify its decision with public policy. A
subsequent decision, however., has apparently corrected this tampering
and reflects a reinstatement of Wood and its interpretation of Ohio's
wrongful death statutes as controlling law. It remains to be seen, however, whether Hill has permanently overruled Wood when wrongful
death claims, underinsured motorist coverage, and multiple claimants
are involved in a case.
The Ohio Supreme Court could have interpreted the statute in a
way which would have avoided this unfair and unjust result, but it incorrectly construed the statute and refused to expand the coverage.
Had the court correctly interpreted the statute, the court would have
discovered that the course it took limited the coverage. Had the court
taken the correct course, there would have been nothing to expand. As
a result, the court created a loophole in underinsured motorist coverage. The statute, correctly interpreted, adequately takes care of situations involving multiple claimants.
Timothy Young
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